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INTRODUCTION
Water is essential to life in the arid environment of the
western United States. For centuries, humans have used the
Colorado River to fulfill their needs and until the past 100
years, the use of the river was sustainable. Over the last
100 years, the Colorado River has been dammed and diverted to
"reclaim" the arid west for man's use. In 1946, a Department
of the Interior report stated that "Tomorrow the Colorado will
be utilized to the very last drop. Its water will convert
thousands of additional acres of sagebrush desert to
flourishing farms and beautiful homes for servicemen,
industrial workers, and native farmers who seek to build
permanently in the West" (U.S. Department of Interior 1946).
"Water was a commodity that needed to be removed from the
river channel and 'put to use'. Water left wild and flowing in
the channel was 'wasted'" (Bates 1993: 4). Indeed, the West
exists as it does today because it has become "one big,
complex plumbing system" (Fradkin 1981: 9). In 1922, the
Colorado River Compact was drafted to allocate the waters of
the river between the two halves of the Colorado River Basin
to encourage development. The development that has occurred
in the basin states due to the availability of water has been
unprecedented. At this time it would appear that the Colorado
River Compact should be revised to account for changes in the
region as well as the inadequacies of the original document.
BACKGROUND
The states of the Colorado River Basin grew as they did
because the federal government had adopted a populist policy
which was intended to entice thousands of people to move west
and to economically anchor the small communities that were
being created (High Country 1987: 159). The seven basin
states consisted of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada,
Utah, Wyoming, and California. Through government marketing,
people living in the east were offered cheap land with
plentiful water for agriculture. With this offer, thousands
packed up their families and moved west. In the 1890's, the
standard for this Manifest Destiny attitude was "The Conquest
of Arid America" (Fradkin 1981: 25). The Carey Act of 1894
gave land to the western states if they would promote the
reclamation and settling of that land (Fradkin 1981: 80). In
1893, William E. Smythe, a newspaper editor, not only saw room
for a million new homes but also a hundred million new
inhabitants in the West (Fradkin 1981: 25). Limits on growth
were, and too often still are, "frequently regarded as being
something vaguely communist, or at best a socialist plot"
(Fradkin 1981: 25).
The population of the Colorado River Basin from the Civil
War to 1900 was about 260,000. Just before World War II the
population of the Colorado River Basin had climbed steadily to
about 1 million (Fradkin 1981: 27). Southern California alone
grew from about 260,000 in 1900, which was prior to any major
diversions, to 3.5 million people in 1940 (Fradkin 1981: 27).
The population of Southern California grew at about seven to
eight percent annually throughout the 1960's. Population
growth in the 1960's and 1970's occurred due to people moving
west for retirement and recreation (Fradkin 1981: 27). By the
end of the 1960's, much of the west's population was centered
in the cities (Fradkin 1981: 28). In the 1970's, people
started to move back towards the rural areas. It was at this
time that the growth rate in Southern California began to
stabilize and the majority of growth was outside the state
(Fradkin 1981: 28). The lower basin states of Nevada,
Arizona, and California have, however, seen tremendous growth
through the 1980's and into the 1990's. The population of the
Nevada counties included as part of the basin grew sixty-five
percent between 1980 and 1990. The California counties grew
by sixty-three percent and Arizona grew by thirty-four percent
in this same period. Colorado, an Upper Basin state,
experienced a population increase of sixty-six percent between
1980 and 1990 (Kaseko 1995: App. 1). The Colorado River has
been overused and overallocated in order to supply this influx
of settlers.
The Colorado River is approximately 1400 miles long and
has its headwaters in Colorado's Rocky Mountain National Park
(High Country News 1987: 165). The river stretches to the
Gulf of California in Mexico but the water does not usually
make it there anymore because of its extreme use (High Country
News 1987: 165). There are five main tributaries of the
river; the Green River with its headwaters in the Wind River
Range of Wyoming, the Colorado which connects to the Green in
Utah's Canyonlands National Park, the San Juan River which
starts in the San Juan Mountains of southwestern Colorado, and
the Yampa and Gunnison Rivers (Fradkin 1981: 30). The
separate tributaries drain a watershed of about 242,000 square
miles of the United States and about 2,000 in Mexico (Fradkin
1981: 31). The Colorado starts in "pristine mountain
wildernesses", goes through the "flat desert steppes and
pasturelands of the high country" and drops into "canyon
country" before it finally comes out into the "hot, low
deserts" (Fradkin 1981: 31). The Colorado River now has the
"reputation as the most legislated, litigated, and debated
river in the world" (Carrier 1991: 11).
In 1886, the California Development Company was created
to construct a canal that would deliver water from the
Colorado River to Southern California's Imperial Valley for
irrigated agriculture. This canal, which had crossed the
Mexican border, failed during a flood in the late 1800's. The
Imperial Valley farmers then went to the federal government
and lobbied for a dam that would control the Colorado and a
canal that would not cross the Mexican border. In 1902, the
Reclamation Service finally decided to build what would later
become Hoover Dam, as a part of a comprehensive plan to
develop the Colorado (Fradkin 1981: 186). The construction of
a dam that would only benefit California worried the upstream
states of the Colorado River Basin who saw a great potential
for losing their water rights to California. California
realized that it would have to appease the upper basin states
if they were going to get a federally funded dam (Fradkin
1981: 186). To solve this dilemma, the Colorado River Compact
was written in 1922 (Fradkin 1981: 186). Without the
allocation of water stipulated in the compact, California
could have potentially claimed all the water and
hydroelectricity available from the Colorado River (High
Country News 1987: 159).
INTERSTATE COMPACTS
A compact is defined as "the most binding legal
arrangement possible between two or more states" (Hardy 1982:
foreword). Compacts are entered into for the purpose of
dealing with a problem that goes beyond state boundaries
(Hardy 1982: 1) . Authorization for interstate compacts is
found in the United States Constitution which states that "no
state shall without the consent of Congress enter into any
agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign
power" (Hardy 1982: 2). A water allocation compact is usually
developed to "apportion equitably the waters of interstate
streams in order to further their development and to avoid any
controversy among neighboring states about their relative
rights to the waters" (Doerkson 1975: 39).
Through the supremacy clause of the federal government,
the interstate compact would take "precedence over
inconsistent state laws (Sax 1991: 733). A compact is seen as
a "contract" between the states and would take precedence over
prior statutory law due to the "contract impairment clause"
(Hardy 1982: 3). Interstate compacts cannot be unilaterally
amended or repealed meaning that a state cannot make changes
or back out without the approval of the other states (Hardy
1982: 3) .
Though there are not specific guidelines in which
interstate compacts are developed, there is a basic format
that is often followed.
There are five steps which must be, or may be, taken
in negotiating and concluding an interstate compact;
these are: 1) Congress authorizes the negotiation of
the compact and outlines its purposes; 2) The State
legislature authorizes commissioners representing
them to meet and negotiate a compact; 3) The
commissioners meet (under the chairmanship of a
Federal representative) to negotiate and sign the
compact; 4) The State legislatures ratify the
compact; and 5) Congress ratifies the compact
(Doerkson 1972: 7).
aAfter ratification by Congress, the provisions of the compact
become law (Doerkson 1972: 5). More often than not, the
attempts of states to develop a compact fail to make it all
the way through these steps. These steps are not always
followed to the letter. For instance, many early compact
negotiations did not include a federal representative.
Interstate compacts do, however, require the ratification of
the state and federal legislatures.
The purpose of the Colorado River Compact was to allocate
water between the two halves of the Colorado River Basin, an
upper and lower basin, and to promote development of the
region through water storage and flood protection (Hardy 1982:
4) . This was the first use of a compact to resolve a regional
problem (Hardy 1982: 4) . The states involved in the Colorado
River Compact were Nevada, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Utah, New Mexico, and Wyoming. The river was divided into two
basins, an upper and a lower, at the arbitrary dividing point
of Lee's Ferry, Arizona just downstream of the Utah border. A
state that contained tributaries that flowed into the Colorado
above Lee's Ferry were to be considered Upper Basin states
while a state with tributaries draining into the river below
Lee's Ferry would be a Lower Basin state. The compact
allocated a portion of the river's annual flow to each of
these basins. The actual amounts that were allocated were
based on what was thought to be an annual flow of about 16.8
million acre-feet of water (High Country News 1987: 159).
Each basin was allocated 7.5 million acre-feet a year from the
16.8 million (High Country News 1987: 176). The lower basin
was also allocated an additional 1 million acre-feet of water
above the 7.5 million. The compact requires that the lower
basin gets its share before the upper basin and forbids the
upper basin from withholding water that cannot be put to a
beneficial use (Viscoli 1991: 889). Mexico was to get any
remaining water (Fradkin 1981: 299). The amount of water
allocated turned out to be on the high side because the
measurements were done between 1896 and 1921, an unusually wet
period. The estimated annual flow past Lee's Ferry from 1922
until 1976 was about 13.9 million acre-feet and from 1931 to
1940 it was about 11.8 million acre-feet (Fradkin 1981: 188).
In 1990, less than 5.5 million acre-feet of water made it to
Lake Powell, which was not nearly the amount of water required
downstream (Carrier 1991: 22). Tree ring studies in the basin
have shown the average water flow over the past 400 years to
be about 13.6 million acre-feet a year (Fradkin 1981: 188) .
The Colorado River Compact was not fully implemented
until 1944 when Arizona finally ratified it (Fradkin 1981:
190). Arizona wanted to ensure itself at least some water
before a treaty was signed guaranteeing Mexico 1.5 million
acre-feet of water. The reason for the delay was that the
compact had allocated water between the two basins and not the
individual states. This did not keep Arizona safe from
California's thirst for water. Water was not allocated
between the Lower Basin states until after the 1964 Supreme
Court case of Arizona vs. California in which the Central
Arizona Project (CAP) was authorized (Fradkin 1981: 190).
WATER USE IN THE BASIN
The principal use of Colorado River water is irrigated
agriculture. Farmers in the West did not want to have to rely
on rain because it is too unpredictable. They wanted
irrigation water because it is a more dependable source. It
has been estimated that about 90 percent of water in the upper
basin is used for irrigating crops (Fradkin 1981: 31).
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Approximately 85 percent of the lower basin's water goes to
agriculture (Fradkin 1981: 32). Much of the water is used to
grow water intensive crops such as alfalfa, cotton, small
grains, and rice (Carrier 1991: 28). Of the 1.6 million
irrigated acres in the upper basin, 88 percent is used to grow
feed for livestock. In the lower basin, 82 million out of 99
million acres is rangeland (Fradkin 1981: 32). "In terms of
the largest amounts of water consumed and land used, it (the
West) is a vast feedlot for livestock" (Fradkin 1981: 31). In
1975, agriculture used 7.5 million acre-feet of the Colorado
River Basin's water while cities and industry only took
630,000 acre-feet (Fradkin 1981: 76). Recreation, fish, and
wildlife required 50,000 acre-feet and evaporation accounted
for 2.3 million acre-feet (Fradkin 1981: 76). The 2.3 million
acre-feet lost to evaporation was more than what was used by
all of the upper basin plus Nevada (Fradkin 1981: 76).
Much of the water is diverted out of the basin
altogether. More water is taken out of the Colorado River
basin than from any other U.S. basin (Fradkin 1981: 76). The
lower Colorado consists of a few large diversions. Southern
California has the Colorado River Aqueduct, the Imperial and
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Coachella Valleys have the All American Canal, and Arizona has
the Central Arizona Project (High Country News 1987: 199).
The upper Colorado, in contrast, has numerous smaller
diversions (High Country News 1987: 199). With the completion
of the Central Arizona Project in the mid-1980's, the Colorado
also supplies Phoenix and Tucson with river water (High
Country News 1987: 169). Even before the Central Arizona
Project was completed in the 1980's, the two basins used 11
million acre-feet out of an average annual flow of about 14
million acre-feet. The CAP now takes an additional 2 million
acre-feet that belongs to the upper basin (High Country News
1987: 200). Both Arizona and California have become dependent
on the millions of acre-feet of water that the upper basin is
not yet using. In addition, many of the upper basin states
are attempting to find ways to utilize their full allotment of
water before they lose it permanently to the lower basin
states.
WESTERN WATER LAW
The Upper Basin's concerns about losing its water to the
Lower Basin are not unfounded. As the West was being
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developed and irrigated it was necessary to create a "complete
property law of water rights" (Tarlock 1990: 5-5). Water
became a commodity to be privatized as shown in a statement
once made by present Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt,
"the history of western water politics is an unthinking
divestment of the water resource to the states and from them
to the users with the federal government a co-conspirator in
the reclamation process that accelerated that divestment"
(Babbitt 1993: 935). State laws define water rights and also
regulate land use policies that affect water use yet remain
subject to federal authority (Feldman 1991: 66). A water
right is "best characterized as a use privilege, since there
is not tangible property to which ownership could be claimed"
and it is "specified in terms of diversion and use with a
time, location, and quantity of flow dimension" (Hartman 1970:
17) . The federal government bases its authority of water
rights on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution which
permits regulation of waterways for navigation and interstate
commerce involving water use and federal reserved rights under
the Winters Doctrine (Feldman 1991: 66).
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Prior Appropriation
Western water law is based on the concept of "prior
appropriation". The party that starts using the water first
maintains the right to that water. "First in time, first in
right" is the basis for prior appropriation (Fradkin 1981:
115) . This gives the oldest users almost unquestionable
seniority and ownership of a water right (Carrier 1991: 19).
To give the prior appropriation doctrine legal standing,
Congress passed the Act of 1866 which stated:
That whenever by priority of possession,
rights to the use of water for mining,
agriculture, manufacturing, or other
purposes, have vested and accrued, and the
same are recognized by local customs, laws,
and the decisions of courts, the possessors
and owners of such vested rights shall be
maintained and protected in the same (Tarlock
1990: 5-8).
Through prior appropriation, water users obtain rights
through the priority of a beneficial use and have an exclusive
right to that allotment (Dzurik 1990: 27). The right-holders
are divided into senior and junior appropriators. The senior
appropriators are entitled to a fixed amount of water that is
equal to that amount originally vested. The junior
appropriator obtains whatever water is left over after the
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senior appropriators (Dzurik 1990: 27). Therefore, if there
is a senior appropriator on a waterway and there is a
shortage, the senior appropriator will get his entire
allotment even if the others go dry (Franks 1991: 551). The
vested rights acquired through prior appropriation continue
for only as long as "the type and place of their beneficial
use and point of diversion remain the same" (Dzurik 1990: 29).
Through the beneficial use clause, "no appropriator can divert
more water than actually needed" (Dzurik 1990: 29). A
beneficial use, however, has been defined very loosely over
the years. For instance, the flooding of fields to kill
gophers has even been accepted as a beneficial use (Bates
1993: 181). The main criticism of the prior appropriation and
beneficial use doctrines are that they promote waste and do
not encourage conservation. When the right-holder tries to
conserve water, anything left over is put back into the system
for appropriation by others. The right-holders do not want to
lose their right through the "use it or lose it" clause and
often flood their fields in order to maintain their allocation
(Tietenberg 1992: 232).
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Federal Water Rights
Federal-reserved water rights are also an important
consideration when allocating water from the basin. Federal
rights are reserved for federal lands such as national parks,
forests, monuments, or Indian reservations (Dzurik 1990: 34).
These federal lands have implied water rights which usually
have seniority over appropriators (Babbitt 1993: 938). This
is based on the Winters Doctrine and the Supreme Court case of
Arizona vs. California which reserved water rights to any
federal land which Congress had designated for a use (Babbitt
1993: 938). The federally reserved water rights are not based
on a beneficial use and cannot be taken away for non-use
(Dzurik 1990: 36). Federal water rights, however, are not
unlimited. The Supreme Court case of the United States vs.
New Mexico held that "implied reservation of water rights
doctrine reserves only that amount of water necessary to
fulfill the purpose of the reservation and no more" (Dzurik
1990: 35).
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ELEMENTS OF AN INTERSTATE COMPACT
Law and policy concerning water in the West is certainly
a complex system but interstate compacts can be a positive way
for the states to come together. There are several elements
that can make an interstate compact successful.
Mutual Agreement and Negotiation Provisions
The inclusion of a provision regarding mutual agreement
is one important element of a good compact. Unanimity is
usually required in "matters requiring commission action"
(Doerkson 1975: 46). The compact should contain a "mutually
acceptable method for resolving paralyzing impasses" to
encourage agreement (Sax 1991: 738). In the absence of mutual
agreement or congressional action the states have a basis for
"equitable apportionment" (Sax 1991: 746). In equitable
apportionment, each state is equal in standing. When a
state's action affects another state, the matter must be
settled in federal court. This can be a very costly and time
consuming way in which to settle disputes between states. If
the compact has a way of encouraging consensus, the process
can be made more efficient and less costly.
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The amount of time required to reach an agreement between
states can be a factor that could make an interstate compact
undesirable. Interstate compacts tend to involve a lengthy
period of time to get established because they must be
negotiated by the state representatives who often have
conflicting interests (Hardy 1982: 20). Decreasing the length
of time necessary to negotiate a compact can be accomplished
in several ways. Negotiation can be facilitated if there is a
sense of a common threat to the system. For instance, this
occurred when the upper basin states felt that California
might get a large share of the Colorado if these states did
not act quickly. Negotiation can be successful if: the states
feel that their interests will be protected, the states see
the provisions of the compact as being mutually beneficial,
and the number of issues raised is limited (Doerkson 1975:
14) . A "generalized acceptance of responsibility can be a
unifying factor in interstate negotiations" (Doerkson 1975:
13). The average length of time involved in the negotiation
of interstate compacts has been calculated as four years and
nine months. The length of time increases to six years and
nine months if natural resources are involved and eight years
18
and nine months if water resources are included (Doerkson
1972: 18).
Federal Representation
The inclusion of a federal representative can also be
beneficial to the negotiation and implementation of a compact.
The "federal government by legislative action becomes one of
the parties in the compact" (Doerkson 1972: 11). The support
of the federal government is crucial to the ultimate success
of a compact attempt (Doerkson 1975: 13). There may be an
improved chance of Congressional ratification if the federal
government was able to provide its input from the beginning.
This gives the process an opportunity for cooperation instead
of the potential for conflict. Congress may give the federal
representative the "responsibility to administer the division
of interstate streams (Sax 1991: 738). Some compacts allow
the federal representative a vote on commission matters or
have the authority to vote in the case of a tie-breaker (Sax
1991: 738). This close interaction between the states and the
federal government has the potential to make the compact
process much more efficient. Federal-state compacts, for
19
instance, would require both the states and the federal
government to conform their water resource programs to a plan
(Doerkson 1972: 12).
Flexibility
A compact that is open to revision and therefore not
inflexible has also been shown to be an effective tool.
"Change is inevitable, and any lasting decision-making
framework can be only that - a framework that is flexible and
can adapt to changing circumstances" (MacDonnell 1993: 225) .
"The compact can be written to include provisions for an
expedited process of amendment, provisions for periodic review
of the compact, or other types of provisions such as one that
grants the compact clear authority to change in the face of
certain conditions and events" (Hardy 1982: 10). Revisions
and amendments to a compact often require consensus of the
states involved which could require the complete renegotiation
of the provisions. This can be somewhat alleviated by giving
the compact commissions sufficient authority to work through
problems (Hardy 1982: 21). A way around inflexibility is to
include "amendment and termination provisions" to the compact
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allowing more efficient changes (Hardy 1982: 21). Hardy
states that inflexibility may not always be undesirable. It
would be desirable in areas such as water rights "where a
degree of finality is necessary" (Hardy 1982: 21).
Flexibility in a compact would enable the states to work out
any problems without the use of equitable apportionment.
Interstate Commissions
The creation of an interstate basin management agency can
also be a positive element of a compact. An interstate
commission would encourage the free flow of information
between the involved states as well as the concept of the
river as a regional resource. A criticism of states without
this type of commission is that they have a "lack of a single,
responsible, disinterested, overall responsibility and
leadership to balance and overcome state particularism and
resolve conflicting issues" (Doerkson 1972: 17). A regional
commission would provide for a party immune to bias. For a
commission to be successful it needs to have a substantial
degree of authority, it needs to be independent of other
governmental structures, and have assured funding (Colborn
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1990: 195). Early compacts gave the state water
administrators the responsibility of carrying out the
provisions of the compact. Later compacts provided for a
"permanent administrative body", or commission to accomplish
this (Doerkson 1975: 40). Commissions are often made up of
state representatives and a representative of the federal
government (Doerkson 1975: 40). Most are dependent on the
individual states for funding (Doerkson 1975: 43) .
Commissions are usually empowered to implement the provisions
found in the compact (Doerkson 1975: 43). They are "generally
authorized to undertake only those activities related to fact
finding and general commission operating functions" while
enforcement of the compact commissions findings is often left
up to the signatory states (Doerkson 1975: 44). A criticism
of this approach, however, is that it does not give the
commission adequate authority.
Public Input
Public input is also an important element of a good
compact. The "free flow of information and ideas between
concerned citizens and government officials is an essential
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element in the development and implementation of public
policy" (Colborn 1990: 214). Public input allows all of the
interests affected by a policy to express their views and not
just the views of the rich and powerful. Public input gives
the authorities a party to whom they must answer. This gives
the public more say and more information about matters that
may closely concern them.
CASE STUDIES OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS
There are dozens of interstate compacts that have been
created to solve disputes between states. Some of these
compacts have survived the negotiation process and been
implemented successfully while others have never gotten past
negotiation. Many of the successful compacts have included
one or more of the elements discussed previously.
The Delaware River Basin Compact
The Delaware River Basin Compact was approved in 1961 and
is an example of a successful compact. This compact involved
the states of Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania
and is an example of a federal-interstate agreement. The
23
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purpose of the Delaware compact was to "promote interstate
comity" and to protect the region's water resources as well as
F
"encourage and provide for the conservation, utilization,
development, management, and control" of the water (Doerkson
1975: 48). The need for a compact started in 1931 when the
states went to the Supreme Court seeking the equitable r-
apportionment of water from the river basin. Not satisfied
with the court's decision, the states entered into a compact
in 1961 that would administer the basin as a shared resource
instead of through individual allocations. [
The Delaware River Basin Commission was created out of
the compact and consists of former state governors, one from
each state, and a federal representative (Doerkson 1975: 49).
The federal representative is appointed by the president and
has the right to vote on compact matters. A unanimous vote of
all members is required on issues involving water allocation
while a majority vote is required on other matters (Sax 1991:
742). The purpose of this commission was to "formulate a
comprehensive plan for present use and the long-term
development of the basin" (Sax 1991: 742). The Delaware
24
Commission was originally given only recommendatory and
evaluative powers, but later was given enforcement authority
to actually implement the provisions of the compact (Doerkson
1975: 50). This change gave the commission the authority to
make and enforce rules and establish standards (Doerkson 1975:
52) . The commission was empowered to "approve all projects in
the basin having substantial effect on the water resources of
the basin" as well as insisting that the states follow
conservation requirements (Sax 1991: 743). This commission
obtains its funding through state appropriations and private
money markets.
Positive aspects of this compact are that it recognized
conservation and long term development as being important.
The compact was also written in a manner which allowed
flexibility. Changes to the provisions of the compact were
allowed as necessary. For instance, the commission had the
"authority to make water allocation adjustments among the
states and their political subdivision as conditions warrant"
(Doerkson 1975: 53). This compact then, was "designed to
overcome an inflexible apportionment of waters" (Doerkson
1975: 53). This allows for extreme situations such as drought
25
and avoids costly litigation between the states (Doerkson
1975: 53).
The Connecticut River Basin Compact
The Connecticut River Basin Compact includes several of
the positive elements of a good compact. This compact
encompasses Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and
Connecticut. In 1927, several major floods hit the New
England area which prompted the states to collaborate
effectively and quickly on flood control measures (Gere 1968:
18). Another reason why the New England states acted quickly
was so the federal government would not have set up a federal
water authority which would have decreased the states
sovereignty. Conflict did arise over ideological differences
between the regions which did slow the negotiation process.
The states involved had different viewpoints regarding the
loss of homes and lands and the construction of flood control
facilities. Negotiations over the disagreements lasted
several months. The federal government, not wanting the delay
to last any longer, took the position that if the situation
was not straightened out, there would not be an interstate
26
compact. The attitude of the time was that the role of the
federal government should be limited which prompted the states
to action. This points to an obvious positive role of
including the federal government in the compact process. By
having an outside party involved, there is a way to break up
stagnant negotiations.
Part of this compact, as it was originally written,
consisted of a provision that the states would have the right
to power development. The federal government opposed this
section because it felt the provision would give the states
too much authority. The first attempts at an interstate
compact failed largely due to the inclusion of this provision
(Gere 1968: 25). Much time may have been saved if a federal
representative had been included in the negotiation process
from the start. The federal government's position would have
been heard at a much earlier date saving a lot of time. Even
though these first compacts did not succeed, they did create a
foundation for later success.
In 1945, the New England states once again attempted to
create an interstate compact for flood control purposes. The
New England Interstate Flood Control Commission was created to
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resolve conflicts arising from the federal-interstate
relationship (Gere 1968: 31). The negotiation process for
this compact was delayed many times. The commission was in a
continuous state of flux with members constantly changing.
These new members needed to be brought up to date on
commission matters slowing the process down drastically.
Also, the commission members did not want this attempt to
fail. They created several drafts of the compact in an
attempt to satisfy both the states and the federal government.
Whereas the 1937 attempt at a compact was multipurpose in
nature, the 1945 draft focused simply on flood control and
left out other areas such as the power clause making it much
simpler for the commission to reach a consensus. This compact
was ratified by Congress in 1952, only seven years after this
attempt started and thirty years after the process first
began.
The Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Commission
created from the 1937 compact had the powers to acquire land
for reservoir easements, operate and maintain reservoirs, pay
the cost of leasing land, and work with the federal government
on developing flood control plans (Gere 1968: 24). This
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commission also had the responsibility of calculating tax and
economic loss figures for the upstream and downstream states.
The commission determined the downstream states share of the
economic losses. Coordination between the states, as well as
the states and the federal government, was prevalent after the
compact was ratified. The line separating each entity's
responsibilities was clearly spelled out eliminating much of
the conflict that had previously existed.
The New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact
Like the New England flood control compacts, the New
England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact was
developed and implemented by the states in order to head off
federal intervention. This compact was only one year in the
making. The need for a compact dealing with water pollution
control was first addressed in 1946 and was approved by the
state legislatures and Congress in 1947. This compact
includes a provision which acknowledges flexibility as an
important tool for interstate compacts. One of the compact
provisions states that each state would prepare water
classification schedules. "Such classifications would be
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subject to periodic change, of course, as conditions and
requirements on interstate streams changed..." (Gere 1968:
40) .
The Upper Colorado Basin Compact
In 1948, the Upper Colorado Basin Compact was drafted as
a way to allocate Colorado River water between the Upper Basin
states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. These
states acted quickly because they felt that if they did not
they may lose the water to the lower basin. Instead of
allocating a fixed amount of water such as the Colorado River
Compact did, this compact allocated a percentage of the water
actually available (JSFathanson 1980: 97). The Upper Basin
states, based on previous experience, realized that the amount
of water in the river would vary from year to year. By
allocating the water in this way, there is less chance of a
dispute over water quantities that are insufficient to fulfill
a state's allocation. In order to fulfill their obligations
to the Lower Basin, the compact requires that, in the case of
a shortage, each Upper Basin state contributes a proportionate
quantity of water (Nathanson 1980: 1.90). With this provision
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there is a decreased opportunity for disputes among the states
involved.
This compact allowed for the creation of a regional
commission that had not only research and recommendatory
powers but also the authority to adopt rules and regulations.
The commission consisted of one representative from each of
the states and a federal representative who would have full
voting rights (Doerkson 1975: 41).
Article XVI of this compact states that "the failure of
any state to use the water, or any part thereof, the use of
which is apportioned to it under the terms of this Compact,
shall not constitute a relinquishment of the right to such use
to the Lower Basin or to any other State, nor shall it
constitute a forfeiture or abandonment of the right to such
use" (Nathanson 1980: 1.96). This was an attempt by the
Upper Basin states to try to save any water that they might
not use. According to the Colorado River Compact, any water
not used by the Upper Basin must be allowed to go downstream.
*
The Upper Basin states did not want the Lower Basin to claim
that this water was now theirs.
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The California-Nevada Interstate Compact
The California-Nevada Interstate Compact was created to
protect the Tahoe Basin from the effects of development and
tourism. The compact allowed the creation of the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) which was given substantial
authority. The jurisdiction of the TRPA was defined by the
natural watershed of the region instead of traditional
political boundaries. The compact required that the TRPA must
adopt "environmental standard[s] necessary to maintain a
significant scenic, recreational, educational, scientific, or
natural value of the [Tahoe] region" (MacDonnell 1993: 220).
It also required that activities that would "substantially
affect the resources of the basin" be reviewed (MacDonnell
1993: 220). The TRPA held a consensus-building workshop in
which all interest groups were invited to participate. The
compact now includes a limit on the number of residential
building permits and a slightly more relaxed permitting system
for commercial development that a local government can issue
(MacDonnell 1993: 220). The TRPA system also includes
"special protection for stream environment zones (SEZs) where
no permanent disturbance is allowed except for roads and
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public facilities, and provisions calling for strict
regulation of activities on designated environmentally
sensitive lots" (MacDonnell 1993: 220). Along with the
emphasis on conservation, the TRPA mandated restrictions on
growth in the Tahoe region in order to minimize the
detrimental effects on the area (MacDonnell 1993: 220). There
was a realization that without limits on growth, any attempts
to obtain their goals would be fruitless.
The Multistate Tax Compact
The Multistate Tax Compact was created as a response to a
Supreme Court ruling regarding the taxation of interstate
businesses. The compact was developed with the purpose of
determining and collecting taxes that were owed by these
businesses. The states had concluded that the traditional
state tax administration, as it was designed, was inefficient
and costly (Hardy 1982: 1). The states set out to find a way
in which they could make the system more efficient without
having too much federal intervention. Indeed, the states
which were involved with this document were able to draft and
implement the provisions while the federal government was
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still looking into what could be done. The Multistate compact
was written with several positive elements. It promotes
uniformity and compatibility, it facilitates convenience and
compliance, and avoids duplication (Hardy 1982: 1). The
compact also established a commission comprised of
representatives from all the member states. This commission
was given a substantial amount of authority, one of the
elements necessary for a successful commission. It was
empowered to carry out the provisions of the interstate
compact and had the responsibility to facilitate the proper
determination of liabilities, equitable apportionment, and the
settlement of disputes among the states (Hardy 1982: 1).
Along with the interstate compacts that have been
successful, there have been compacts that have not. Examples
of these would be the Columbia River Interstate Compact and
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
The Columbia River Interstate Compact
The Columbia River Interstate Compact was created from a
desire to allocate the river for hydropower (Doerkson 1972:
34
23). The compact involved the states of Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. Nevada and Utah
were later taken out of the compact negotiation. The compact
was an "attempt to establish a regional institutional
structure for river basin development as an alternative to
more development by federal government" (Doerkson 1972: 1).
Compact negotiation was based on a need to allocate water and
instream flows (Doerkson 1975: 7). Conflicts developed from
the fact that dams would need to be constructed in the
downstream states whereas storage reservoirs would need to be
constructed in the upstream states. The upstream states did
not want to see their land drowned under reservoirs built for
the benefit of the downstream states. They wanted to make
sure that "downstream non-consumptive uses were subordinated
to upstream consumptive uses" (Doerkson 1975: 33). Instream
flows were important in "negotiations because of their
relationship to allocation of water" (Doerkson 1975: 18).
Water quality and fish and wildlife management also needed to
be taken into consideration in the negotiation process
(Doerkson 1975: 20).
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Other aspects that needed to be considered in the compact
negotiation process included federal interests, intrastate
water-use priorities, and Native American water rights
(Doerkson 1975: 10). The federal interests would be concerned
with "established federal uses and water rights", the states
would be concerned about effects on their preferred water
uses, and the question of Native American water rights would
have had a bearing on the amounts of water available for
allocation (Doerkson 1975: 9).
There are several potential reasons that the Columbia
River Compact failed to be ratified. The diversity of the
Pacific Northwest could be one of these reasons. The
different priorities and viewpoints of the state
representatives made any consensus almost impossible. Each
state had its own special interests. The downstream states
did not want to become "energy parks" for California (Lee
1980: 242). Idaho and Montana, both considered upstream
states, were reluctant to give "energy service" to the
downstream states (Lee 1980: 242). The upstream states wanted
to keep the water for different reasons. Also, Idaho wanted
to keep it for irrigation while Montana wanted it for
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environmental reasons (Lee 1980: 242). Washington, a
downstream state, wanted water for hydro-electric power while
Oregon, another downstream state, was focused on the water
available for its intrastate streams (Doerkson 1975: 11).
Another potential reason for failure was that "the
Compact became embroiled in an ideological conflict related to
power marketing" (Doerkson 1972: 181). There was a strong
conflict at the time over private versus publicly owned
utilities in the region. The public power groups wanted more
federal involvement in power generation which the private
power advocates felt would decrease their market share
(Doerkson 1972: 34). The prevalent attitude of the time was
against excess government interference at the federal level.
The states wanted more sovereignty (Doerkson 1975: 24) . The
provisions of this compact may have also been adverse to the
interests of federal agencies. It may have interfered with
federal water rights and the "repayment ability of federal
power plants in downstream states" (Doerkson 1972: 88). Also,
there may have been too many issues at stake to get the full
approval of all the states. These included water allocation,
hydropower, fish and wildlife, and irrigated agriculture. The
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various states all had different priorities. One unifying
factor in the negotiation process was the states' consensus
that the potential for water diversion to the southwest needed
to be eliminated (Doerkson 1975: 22). By allocating all the
water through a compact, it was felt that the southwestern
states would not be able to appropriate any of the Columbia.
An early attempt at negotiating this compact included a
provision for the creation of the Interstate Compact
Commission. The commission "represented an attempt to achieve
local control of water resources and river development by
private enterprise, as an alternative to further development
by the federal government and policies favoring public power
groups" (Doerkson 1972: 57). This commission was often at
odds with the Columbia Basin Inter-Agency Committee which
consisted of federal authorities. The state commission was
not permitted to participate in the decision-making process of
the federal committee which led to much resentment. Much of
the state commission's authority was overshadowed by the
federal committee. The state commission did not have a chance
to succeed due to this extra layer in the system. The
commission needed to be independent of other governmental
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structures and given more authority. The later Pacific
Northwest River Basins Commission had a more significant
presence in the process partly due to a general acceptance of
federal involvement (Doerkson 1975: 26). This entity provided
for more state-federal interaction than the previous attempt.
By decreasing the number of groups that deal with the basin,
the process was made more efficient.
The authority given to the Pacific Northwest River Basins
Commission, however, created conflict. There were questions
of whether the commission would only be able to make
recommendations or if they could also construct water projects
and raise funds (Doerkson 1972: 81). It was finally decided
that the commission would have the authority to evaluate and
make recommendations but not have the power for financing and
construction (Doerkson 1972: 82). Another source of
controversy found in the commission structure was that it
contained members with many different attachments, some of
which conflicted (Doerkson 1972: 57). For a commission to be
effective it has to have some sort of cohesion, leadership,
and resources, elements which the Columbia River Commission
lacked (Doerkson 1972: 58).
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The length of negotiation time is shown in Columbia River
compact attempts. Attempts to ratify the compact were made in
1955, 1957, 1961, 1963, and 1965, all of which failed
(Doerkson 1972: 177). The commission spent eighteen years in
the negotiation process and made several attempts at
ratification (Doerkson 1972: 1). The 1963 compact attempt
apparently was rejected by the Oregon legislature due to a
lack of provisions for the control of water pollution which
led to its demise (Doerkson 1975: 36). The 1965 compact was
killed for the same reason.
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
The 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the
United States and Canada was created to improve the water
quality and environment of the lakes. This compact was based
on the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 which stipulated that
any boundary waters or water flowing across the boundary would
not be polluted (Colborn 1990: 194).
There are a few apparent reasons for the failure of the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. First of all, there was
little support given towards reaching the objectives of the
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agreement by either of the national governments (Colborn 1990:
194). The support as spelled out in the agreement was not
provided. Another apparent reason for the agreement's failure
was that the United States and Canada could not resolve their
differences in political philosophies, laws, and policy making
(Colborn 1990: 196).
The 1909 agreement created the International Joint
Commission (IJC) to implement the provisions of this agreement
(Colborn 1990: 195). The Great Lakes compacts gave their
commissions purely recommendatory power and only limited
resources (Doerkson 1975: 47). It was not given substantial
authority nor was it independent of other governmental
structures. Both of the national governments felt that the
IJC should be limited in its authority (Colborn 1990: 200).
The IJC's role of implementing the provisions of the compact
was hindered because of having to contend with multiple layers
of government. The organizational structure of the system
"placed responsibility for the Lakes in at least three
separate internal administrative regions" (Ashworth 1986:
247). In Canada, there was only one province that was
involved in the agreement which limited the number of
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governmental levels that were encountered in that country.
There were many more state-federal interactions encountered in
the United States. In both countries, the actual
implementation of the provisions was left to the local
governments, adding another significant layer to the process
(Colborn 1990: 198). Until an amendment in 1987, the line
separating the responsibilities of the International Joint
Commission and the national governments was unclear which
caused an unwillingness of its members to take on certain
responsibilities (Colborn 1990: 198). A protocol drafted in
1987 clarified the IJC role of evaluation of the Great Lakes
system and advisement to the national governments though the
political differences of the two countries were still an
obstacle. The IJC is under the authority of the Great Lakes
Water Quality Board which is made up essentially of government
officials. This raises the concern that the assessments of
the IJC may not have the unbiased position'that they should.
One positive aspect of this compact attempt is that it
included public input, though input was less likely to occur
in Canada due to an implicit trust in the national government.
The IJC is authorized to hold public meetings and to
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disseminate information about the activities involving the
agreement. Another positive aspect of the compact is that it
took environmental impacts into consideration. According to
the compact, "diversions not allowed if they would have
significant, adverse impacts on lake levels, in-basin uses,
and the Great Lakes ecosystem" (Colborn 1990: 213) .
COLORADO RIVER COMPACT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISION
While the Colorado River Compact was initially acceptable
as an early attempt to allocate water, it is insufficient in
some important areas such as water quality and Native American
water rights. Also, the Colorado River Basin has changed
dramatically since this document was drafted creating a need
for its revision to account for current conditions in the
Basin.
Creation of an Interstate Commission
The Colorado River Compact does not provide for a
regional, or basin-wide, management agency to deal with water
matters. An interstate commission would encourage the free
flow of information between the involved states as well as the
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concept of the river as a regional resource. Currently, the
Colorado River Basin states have a "lack of a single,
responsible, disinterested, overall responsibility and
leadership to balance and overcome state particularism and
resolve conflicting issues" (Doerkson 1972: 17). The basin
states each have at least one agency that deals with water
from the Colorado. These agencies tend to work independently
of each other and are usually only looking out for what is in
the best interest of their state, usually in the short term
instead of the long term. The basin should be considered a
regional resource and managed appropriately. A tug-of-war
between the states for control of the water supply can not
only have detrimental effects on the basin but also the people
of the region. For this commission to be successful it would
need to have a substantial degree of authority, be independent
of other governmental structures, and have assured funding
(Colborn 1990: 195).
Amendment Provisions
The Colorado River Compact also should be open to
revision to avoid inflexibility. "The compact can be written
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to include provisions for an expedited process of amendment,
provisions for periodic review of the compact, or other types
of provisions such as one that grants the compact clear
authority to change in the face of certain conditions and
events" (Hardy 1982: 10). A way around inflexibility is to
include "amendment and termination provisions" to the compact
allowing more efficient changes to the compact (Hardy 1982:
21) . Flexibility in a compact would enable the states to work
out any problems without the use of equitable apportionment.
This is currently important to the Colorado River Basin
because of the dramatic growth that the region has experienced
in the past few years. If the compact was more flexible, the
states could potentially work out compromises for needed water
that could benefit all concerned.
Public Input
A revised compact should include more public input. The
Native Americans and Mexico were not given any input during
the drafting of the compact. The compact did not deal with
Native American water rights and the only water it granted to
Mexico was whatever was left over after the states were
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through with it. A later treaty between the United States and
Mexico that was signed in 1944 gave Mexico 1.5 million acre-
feet of Colorado River water a year but did not mention water
quality (High Country News 1987: 177). The Native Americans
were not only left out of the Colorado River Compact but in a
1948 compact as well. They are now claiming their rights to
Colorado River water under the Prior Appropriation Doctrine.
The Winters Doctrine from the early 1900's assured the Native
Americans that they would get as much water as they needed
because they possessed "prior and superior rights" (Fradkin
1981: 144). In the 1963 and 1983 Supreme Court cases of
Arizona vs. California, the federal government, acting as the
trustee for the tribes, claimed that the Native Americans
should have rights to the water before others since they were
on the land first (Fradkin 1981: 157). The Native American
claim to water may even be "aboriginal", meaning that they
would have priority over the federal government as well
(Franks 1991: 551). Political pressure from the states
defeated this move in short order. The federal government saw
an implied obligation to the Native Americans to create a
livable environment on the reservation. But like other
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federal lands, the reservations did not have the right to
unlimited amounts of water (Dzurik 1990: 36). In Arizona vs.
California, water was only made available for "practicably
irrigable acreage" which was land that could be economically
planted (Fradkin 1981: 144). The water use would be seen as
economically feasible if, after a cost/benefit analysis, the
benefits outweighed the costs (Franks 1991: 553). This was
quite a difference from the way water was used by the
agricultural interests who were flooding their fields with
their water allocations. The views of the Native Americans
and Mexico were obviously left out of the original compact.
The viewpoints of these groups, as well as any other groups
with an interest in the river, should be taken into
consideration in any future compact discussions.
Water Allocation
The method of water allocation to the states and basins
should also be readdressed. There are several ways that the
water of the Colorado can be allocated: 1) by specification of
minimum flows at the point of entry into the downstream state.
This method guarantees a certain amount of water to be
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delivered to the downstream states. This would be most felt by
the upstream states in times of drought. 2) Distribution
among the states on the basis of a fixed percentage. This
method "is more equitable to upstream states in dry years but
it does not provide the predictability for downstream states".
3) Division of actual amounts of water annually which is the
method used in the Colorado River Compact. This involves
allocating a specific amount of water to the states on an
annual basis. Upstream storage of water is required in this
method in order to guarantee water flows over the course of
the year. 4) Allocation by a compact commission making
decisions over time based on then current flow conditions.
This method allocates actual existing water and is not
dependent on future projections though it does not give the
states a predictable quantity of water (Doerkson 1975: 8).
There has to be a way to account for the "year to year
variability" of water supplies in order to have an efficient
allocation (Tietenberg 1992: 226). Two of these methods seem
to be reasonable for use in the Colorado River Basin and they
do not include the current method. One would be to allocate
the river water using the method used in the Upper Basin. By
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allocating a percentage of the water actually available there
is less room for a conflict over who is being cheated out of
what. The other would be to have a commission make the
allocations, though this method would be time consuming.
Environment and Conservation
The compact should also include provisions dealing with
the environment. Darrell Knuffke, the Central Rockies
regional director of the Wilderness Society has stated "As the
river has been divided, subdivided, ditched, dammed and
diverted, everyone's interests except the land's have been
considered" (Gray 1991: 25). The "guiding principle" for the
Colorado River Compact, as well as all other resource related
doctrines, should be "conservation, equity, and ecology"
(Bates 1993: 196). "Conservation recognizes that waste is
harmful, that diverse uses are not possible without care, that
limits must be imposed on some uses, and that some reasonable
charge must be imposed on developers who now use public water
for free. Ecology requires that watercourses, as living
ecosystems, be given specific and meaningful protection"
(Bates 1993: 196). If Colorado River water cannot be set
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aside for environmental purposes in the text of the compact,
then environmentally oriented groups should be allowed to
purchase water rights to accomplish this.
A major reason that provisions regarding the environment
should be included in the compact is the presence of extremely
high salinity levels in the river. The high salinity levels
are a product of irrigated agriculture in the United States
and have devastated Mexican agriculture. The Colorado River
naturally picks up 4.7 million tons of salt (High Country News
1987: 202). As pure water is diverted out, there is less for
dilution. Due to the high saline content of the river water
and the marginal soil quality that the water is being placed
on, agricultural lands are taking even more water to obtain an
equal or lesser amount of crops. As the salty water is used
to irrigate fields the salt builds up around the root systems
of crops. A larger amount of water is then needed to flush
away the salts from the plants. This practice, however, only
increases the problem by adding even more saline water to the
system. The resulting concentrations are enough to damage
plumbing and industrial fixtures and to stunt the growth of
crops (High Country News 1987: 202). There have been
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estimates that each additional part per million of salt causes
$600,000 in damage (High Country News 1987: 202). In other
words, each 11,000 tons of salt added to the river causes
$600,000 in damage to the lower basin and Mexico (High Country
News 1987: 202). Further development of the upper basin would
result in more salinity for the downstream users. (High
Country News 1987: 202). The United States government has
only made token gestures at resolving this situation. A
positive trend, however, is that an increasing number of
farmers are discovering that more efficient irrigation
practices, such as a drip system, can actually increase their
crop yield and decrease a major cause of the salt buildup
(Carrier 1991: 32).
Conservation is also an important element that needs to
be considered in the compact. More and more, conservation has
been looked at as a source of new water supplies. The amount
of water lost for use through the process of diversion has
been becoming more of an issue since the Colorado River has
been overallocated. For example, the All-American Canal,
which delivers water to the Imperial Valley loses as much as
106,000 acre-feet of water per year. This water soaks into
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ground and never makes it to the fields. Plans have been made
to line this canal, as well as the other major canals, in an
attempt to save this water. One-million acre-feet of water is
estimated to run off and under the Imperial Valley's irrigated
fields per year (Carrier 1991: 32). It has also been
estimated that about two million acre-feet of water are lost
through evaporation from the reservoirs (Carrier 1991: map).
As the amount of water available for use from the Colorado
River has decreased, more attempts to decrease water lost to
use have been made. Investments made by the municipalities
for conserving agricultural water can increase agricultural
productivity, reduce costs, and improve irrigation practices
(Bates 1993: 154).
The compact should include provisions that encourage
conservation. Changes in the prior appropriation and
beneficial use doctrines are needed to eliminate the
detrimental effects that they now have on the system. Under
these provisions, parties that hold water rights have to put
their entire allocation to a beneficial use or risk losing
their right to it. Most water users would tend to utilize
their allocation to the very last drop which moves far away
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from any idea of conservation. Water users that do try to
conserve water usually see their right decline by the amount
that they had conserved. The beneficial use clause can be
"fixed" by adopting part of the decision of the 1939 Nebraska
Supreme Court case of Enterprise Irrigation District vs.
Willis. In this case, the court determined that a beneficial
use "shall not exceed the least amount of water that
experience indicates is necessary in the exercise of good
husbandry for the production of crops" (Bates 1993: 148).
Spanish water law also recognized that a water right did not
include the right to waste that water. The holder of a water
right "could not deprive his neighbor of its use simply by
wasting that which he did not need" (Brown 1987: 39) .
Water Markets
Conservation can be encouraged through the acceptance of
water markets. By heavily subsidizing the cost of Colorado
River water available to farmers, the federal government has
encouraged waste. "The illusion of plenty hides the
consequences of waste" (Bates 1993: 135). The low cost of
water, as well as the prior appropriation doctrine, has
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encouraged wasteful uses of water such as flood irrigation and
the planting of water intensive crops such as cotton (Gray
1991: 24). In a water market, conservation would be
encouraged because agricultural interests could take any water
that was conserved and sell it in the market. Water marketing
would bring the price of water closer to its "free market"
cost due to municipalities that are willing to buy water from
the farmers at a higher price.
There can be an efficient allocation of water by allowing
the transfer of water rights to high value uses from low value
uses through a free market system (Hartman 1970: 13).
"Traditionally, a market is defined as a set of arrangements
where buyers and sellers are brought together by the price
mechanism" (Colby 1993: 8). It is made up of the
"interactions of actual and potential buyers and sellers of
one or more interrelated water commodities" (Colby-Saliba
1987: 1). A market is created when the potential buyers and
sellers believe that there are economic gains, or net
benefits, to be made by transferring water rights from current
uses to new uses (Colby-Saliba 1987: 4). "The value of water
in the marketplace is increasing as a result of growing demand
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and relatively finite quantities" (Brown 1987: 18). One state
would be able to sell parts of its allocation to another
state. The purchasing state would simply have to take that
water directly out of the river. Water hungry Southern Nevada
becomes a potential buyer in this system. The Upper Basin
states, on the other hand, could be potential suppliers
because they do not usually use their entire allotment of
river water. A state could also pay another state to conserve
its agricultural water and then take the conserved amount out
of the river (Hynes 1993: Al). The states, and not the
individual right holder, should be the agents in such a
market. Water transfers handled by district courts or
administrative agencies may decrease detrimental effects on
third parties (Hartman 1970: 7). This would enable the states
to only allow water transfers that would not be detrimental to
communities or the state itself.
The question then arises of whether these markets are
legal across state lines. The legality of water transfers has
long been questioned. The 1824 case of Gibbons vs. Ogden made
all the surface water in the United States fall under federal
regulation (Feldman 1991: 66). In the later Supreme Court
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case of Sporhase vs. Nebraska, it was ruled that the federal
government could no longer defer water regulation to the
states. The court held that a Nebraska law that limited
exports of water out of the state was an unconstitutional
restriction of the Federal Commerce Clause (Feldman 1991: 67).
This opinion made water subject to interstate commerce
regulation (Tarlock 1990: 5-29). The resulting restrictions
on water transfers make a water market inefficient. Due to
restrictive regulation and the allocation of water rights by
prior appropriation, the ability to transfer water rights has
been lessened (Tietenberg 1992: 232). This combination
reduces the market's ability to move toward the optimal level
for all uses. One result of current intrastate transfers is
that many agricultural communities that are dependent on
revenues generated from farmers are losing their tax base and
are slowly shrinking as the farmers sell out. If some of
these problems could be resolved, "treating water rights as
permanent property rights could be advantageous, promoting
reallocation of water by making rights to its use saleable,
leasable, and otherwise transferable to more socially
desirable uses" (Bates 1993: 157).
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Transferring water to the cities is not going to help the
problem of waste though. Until the people in this region
start paying what the water actually costs there will be waste
in the form of lawns in the desert, swimming pools in every
backyard, and fountains in front of hotels and subdivisions.
Demand for water is much higher if the price is zero or if
there is a set price for any quantity of water used (Brajer
1989: 262). As the price of water goes up, demand goes down
quickly. When the price rises, water supplies are used for
higher value uses such as direct human consumption instead of
landscaping, car washes, and swimming pools. "Simple economic
theory dictates that any resource artificially priced below
its 'equilibrium price' will encounter excess demand" (Brajer
1989: 260). Consumers would be more aware of where the water
was going. "By setting up markets to reallocate the water we
are already using, it will allow those who need more water and
who are willing to pay a higher price to move that water from
lower valued uses in a thoughtfully regulated manner" (Babbitt
1993 : 942) .
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CONCLUSION
The Colorado River Compact should be revised to account
for inadequacies in the original draft and to account for the
dramatic changes that have occurred in the Basin. In summary,
the revisions that could possibly make the Colorado River
Compact a more efficient tool for use in the Colorado River
Basin are: the creation of an Interstate Basin Commission; the
addition of provisions for amendment; the encouragement of
public input; a change in the method used to allocate water;
the addition of provisions regarding the environment and
conservation; and the acceptance of water markets to move
water to higher valued uses. The chance that all of these
elements can be integrated into the Colorado River Compact is
slim. However, if the Colorado River Basin is to reach a
position in which its states can coexist peacefully with each
other and their environment, all of these elements should at
least be taken into consideration. If the Basin is viewed as
a regional resource, all of the elements just might fall into
place.
Westerners have been slow to realize that the Colorado
River is a finite resource (Gray 1991: 22). As the present
58
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt once said, "we are now
engaged in the effort of this generation to find the strings
to pull the water back, to see if we can find some balance, so
that Western water will not just be used, misused, and
polluted but instead will be part of a living, sustainable
use, multi-purpose environment" (Babbitt 1993: 935). To reach
this state, the West must not wholly depend on economic
solutions. They need to review their ideals and lifestyles
and begin to conserve and reuse the West's most precious
resource. A revised Colorado River Compact may be the tool in
which this process can begin.
59

REFERENCES
Ashworth, W. (1986) The Late, Great Lakes: an Environmental
History. Ontario: Collins Publishers.
Babbitt, B. (1993) The Public Interest in Western Water.
Environmental Law. 23(3): 933-942.
Bates, S.; et al. (1993) Searching out the Headwaters: Change
and Rediscovery in Western Water Policy. Washington, B.C.:
Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of
Law.
Brajer, V.; Martin, W. (1989) Allocating a 'Scarce' Resource:
Water in the West. American Journal of Economics and
Sociology. 48(3): 259-271.
Brown, F.L.; Ingram, H. (1987) Water and Poverty in the
Southwest. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
Carrier, J. (1991) The Colorado: a River Drained Dry. National
Geographic. June: 4-34.
Colborn, T.; et al. (1990) Great Lakes: Great Legacy?.
Baltimore, MD: The Conservation Foundation and the Institute
for Research on Public Policy.
Colby, B. (1993) Applying Fair Market Value Concepts to Water
Rights. Real Estate Issues. 18(1): 8-14.
Colby-Saliba, B.; Bush, D. (1987) Water Markets in Theory and
Practice: Market Transfers,, Water Values, and Public Policy.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Doerkson, H.; Wakefield, G. (1975) Columbia Basin Compact
Issues Review. Pullman, WA: Pacific Northwest Regional
Commission.
Doerkson, H. (1972) Columbia River Interstate Compact:
Politics of Negotiation. Pullman, WA: State of Washington
Water Research Center, Washington State University, University
of Washington.
60
Dzurik, A. (1990) Water Resources Planning. Savage, MD: Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Feldman, D. (1991) Water Resources Management. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins Press.
Fradkin, P. (1981) A River No More: the Colorado River and the
West. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1981.
Franks, M. (1991) The uses of the practicably irrigable
acreage standard in the quantification of reserved water
rights. Natural Resource Journal. 31(3): 549-586.
Gere, E. (1968) Rivers and Regionalism in New England.
Amherst, MA: Bureau of Government Research, University of
Massachusetts.
Gray, P. (1991) A Fight Over Liquid Gold. Time. July 22: 22.
Hardy, P. (1982) Interstate Compacts: the Ties that Bind.
Athens, GA: Institute of Government, University of Georgia.
Hartman, L.M.; Seastone, D. (1970) Water Transfers: Economic
Efficiency and Alternative Institutions. Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins Press.
High Country News. (1987) Western Water Made Simple.
Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
Hynes, M. (1993) Water Rivals Listen to Resource Options. Las
Vegas Review-Journal. Nov. 5: Al.
Kaseko, M. (1995) Population in the Colorado River Basin.
unpublished paper. University of Nevada, Las Vegas,
Environmental Studies Program.
Lee, K.; Klemka, D.L. (1980) Electric Power and the Future of
the Pacific Northwest. Pullman, Washington: Washington State
University, University of Washington.
61
Mac Donnell, L.; Bates S. (1993) Natural Resources Policy and
Law: Trends and Directions. Washington, B.C.: Natural
Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law,
Island Press.
Nathanson, M. (1980) Updating the Hoover Dam Documents 1978.
Denver, CO: U.S. Department of the Interior, Government
Printing Office.
Sax, J.; et al. (1991) Legal Control of Water Resources. St.
Paul, MN: West Publishing Company.
Tarlock, A.D. (1990) Law of Water Rights and Resources. New
York: Clark Boardman Comp., Ltd.
Tietenberg, T. (1992) Environmental and Natural Resource
Economics. New York: Harper Collins.
U.S. Department of the Interior. (1946) The Colorado River: a
Natural Menace Becomes a National Resource. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office.
Viscoli, S. (1991) The resource conservation group proposal to
lease Colorado River water. Natural Resource Journal. 31(4):
887-908.
62
APPENDIX
63

1 A.2 - Bar Chart of Water Supply
COLORADO RIVER FLOW
AT
LEE FERRY, ARIZONA PAST DEPLETION
PLUS CRSP STORAGE^
26- CVIRGIN AVERAGE
) FLOW VIRGIN FLOW^ .PROGRESSIVE 10 YEAR ^-1922-78 /
24
22~ HISTORIC^
20- FLOW— >
18- — -
y
f
14-
12-
Q _
6-
4-
2-
o- II 1 11
//(AVERAGE OF VIRGIN FLOW / AVERAGE /
/ \d at end of 5
7w;L> — ^
o oCO ro
cn en
x^ .^
^•'
I
^ear) /
" ' ' ^  ~^^ '
8
VIRGIN FLOW /
W
—
X
~\l''
2} CT)
-J -^ |^
U
1
1
:i
Z
o
X
r-h
00
O
1,
WATER YEAR
OJ
from Nathanson (1980)
1-4 UPDATING THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS
\4
Colorado River Compact, 1922
The States of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, having resolved
to enter into a compact under the Act of the Congress of the United States of America approved August 19,
1921 (42 Statutes at Large, page 171), and the Acts of the Legislatures of the said States, have through their
Governors appointed as their Commissioners:
W.S. Norviel for the State of Arizona,
W.F. McClure for the State of California,
Delph E. Carpenter for the State of Colorado,
J.G. Scrugham for the State of Nevada,
Stephen B. Davis, Jr., for the State of New Mexico,
R.E. Caldwell for the State of Utah,
Frank C. Emerson for the State of Wyoming,
who, after negotiations participated in by Herbert Hoover appointed by The President as the representative of
the United States of America, have agreed upon the following articles:
ARTICLE I
The major purposes of this compact are to provide for the equitable division and apportionment of the use
of the waters of the Colorado River System; to establish the relative importance of different beneficial uses of
water, to promote interstate comity; to remove causes of present and future controversies; and to secure the
expeditious agricultural and industrial development of the Colorado River Basin, the storage of its waters,
and the protection of life and property from floods. To these ends the Colorado River Basin is divided into
two Basins, and an apportionment of the use of part of the water of the Colorado River System is made to
each of them with the provision that further equitable apportionments may be made.
ARTICLE II
As used in this compact—
(a) The term "Colorado River System" means that portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries within
the United States of America.
(b) The term "Colorado River Basin" means all of the drainage area of the Colorado River System and all
other territory within the United States of America to which the waters of the Colorado River System shall be
beneficially applied.
(c) The term "States of the Upper Division" means the States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming.
(d) The term "States of the Lower Division" means the States of Arizona, California, and Nevada.
(e) The term "Lee Ferry" means a point in the main stream of the Colorado River one mile below the
mouth of the Paria River.
(f) The term "Upper Basin" means those parts of the States of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming within and from which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River System above Lee Ferry, and
also all parts of said States located without the drainage area of the Colorado River System which are now or
shall hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted from the System above Lee Ferry.
(g) The term "Lower Basin" means those parts of the States of Arizona. California, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Utah within and from which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River System below Lee Ferry, and
also all parts of said States located without the drainage area of the Colorado River System which are now or
shall hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted from the System below Lee Ferry.
(h) The term "domestic use" shall include the use of water for household, stock, municipal, mining, mill-
ing, industrial, and other like purposes, but shall exclude the generation of electrical power.
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ARTICLE III
(a) There is hereby apportioned from the Colorado River System in perpetuity to the Upper Basin and to
the Lower Basin, respectively, the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water per
annum, which shall include all water necessary for the supply of any rights which may now exist.
(b) In addition to the apportionment in paragraph (a), the Lower Basin is hereby given the right to increase
its beneficial consumptive use of such waters by one million acre-feet per annum.
(c) If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of America shall hereafter recognize in the
United States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters of the Colorado River System, such waters shall be
supplied first from the waters which are surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified in
paragraphs (a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this purpose, then, the burden of such
deficiency shall be equally borne by the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin, and whenever necessary the
States of the Upper Division shall deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the deficiency so recognized
in addition to that provided in paragraph (d).
(d) The States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an
aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive
series beginning with the first day of October next succeeding the ratification of this compact.
(e) The States of the Upper Division shall not withhold water, and the States of the Lower Division shall not
require the delivery of water, which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses.
(f) Further equitable apportionment of the beneficial uses of the waters of the Colorado River System unap-
portioned by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) may be made in the manner provided in paragraph (g) at any time
after October first. 1963, if and when either Basin shall have reached its total beneficial consumptive use as
set out in paragraphs (a) and (b).
(g) In the event of a desire for a further apportionment as provided in paragraph (f) any two signatory
States, acting through their Governors, may give joint notice of such desire to the Governors of the other
signatory States and to The President of the United States of America, and it shall be the duty of the Gover-
nors of the signatory States and of The President of the United States of America forthwith to appoint
representatives, whose duty it shall be to divide and apportion equitably between the Upper Basin and Lower
Basin the beneficial use of the unapportioned water of the Colorado River System as mentioned in paragraph
(f), subject to the legislative ratification of the signatory States and the Congress of the United States of
America.
ARTICLE IV
(a) Inasmuch as the Colorado River has ceased to be navigable for commerce and the reservation of its
waters for navigation would seriously limit the development of its Basin, the use of its waters for purposes of
navigation shall be subservient to the uses of such waters for domestic, agricultural, and power purposes. If
the Congress shall not consent to this paragraph, the other provisions of this compact shall nevertheless re-
main binding.
(b) Subject to the provisions of this compact, water of the Colorado River System may be impounded and
used for the generation of electrical power, but such impounding and use shall be subservient to the use and
consumption of such water for agricultural and domestic purposes and shall not interfere with or prevent use
for such dominant purposes.
(c) The provisions of this article shall not apply to or interfere with the regulation and control by any State
within its boundaries of the appropriation, use, and distribution of water.
ARTICLE V
The chief official of each signatory State charged with the administration of water rights, together with the
Director of the United States Reclamation Service and the Director of the United States Geological Survey
shall cooperate, ex-officio:
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(a) To promote the systematic determination and coordination of the facts as to flow, appropriation, con-
sumption, and use of water in the Colorado River Basin, and the interchange of available information in such
matters.
(b) To secure the ascertainment and publication of the annual flow of the Colorado River at Lee Ferry.
(c) To perform such other duties as may be assigned by mutual consent of the signatories from time to time.
ARTICLE VI
Should any claim or controversy arise between any two or more of the signatory States: (a) with respect to
the waters of the Colorado River System not covered by the terms of this compact; (b) over the meaning or
performance of any of the terms of this compact; (c) as to the allocation of the burdens incident to the
performance of any article of this compact or the delivery of waters as herein provided; (d) as to the construc-
tion or operation of works within the Colorado River Basin to be situated in two or more States, or to be con-
structed in one State for the benefit of another State; or (e) as to the diversion of water in one State for the
benefit of another State; the Governors of the States affected, upon the request of one of them, shall forth-
with appoint Commissioners with power to consider and adjust such claim or controversy, subject to ratifica-
tion by the Legislatures of the States so affected.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the adjustment of any such claim or controversy by any present
method or by direct future legislative action of the interested States.
ARTICLE VII
Nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting the obligations of the United States of America to In-
dian tribes.
ARTICLE VUI
Present perfected rights to the beneficial use of waters of the Colorado River System are unimpaired by this
compact. Whenever storage capacity of 5,000,000 acre-feet shall have been provided on the main Colorado
River within or for the benefit of the Lower Basin, then claims of such rights, if any, by appropriators or users
of water in the Lower Basin against appropriators or users of water in the Upper Basin shall attach to and be
satisfied from water that may be stored not in conflict with Article III.
All other rights to beneficial use of waters of the Colorado River System shall be satisfied solely from the
water apportioned to that Basin in which they are situate.
ARTICLE IX
Nothing in this compact shall be construed to limit or prevent any State from instituting or maintaining any
action or proceeding, legal or equitable, for the protection of any right under this compact or the enforcement
of any of its provisions.
ARTICLE X
This compact may be terminated at any time by the unanimous agreement of the signatory States. In the
event of such termination all rights established under it shall continue unimpaired.
ARTICLE XI
This compact shall become binding and obligatory when it shall have been approved by the Legislatures of
each of the signatory States and by the Congress of the United States. Notice of approval by the Legislatures
shall be given by the Governor of each signatory State to the Governors of the other signatory States and to
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the President of the United States, and the President of the United States is requested to give notice to the
Governors of the signatory States of approval by the Congress of the United States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Commissioners have signed this compact in a single original, which shall be
deposited in the archives of the Department of State of the United States of America and of which a duly cer-
tified copy shall be forwarded to the Governor of each of the signatory States.
DONE at the City of Santa Fe, New Mexico, this twenty-fourth day of November, A.D. One Thousand
Nine Hundred and Twenty-two.
W. S. NORVIEL
W. F. McCLURE
DELPH E. CARPENTER
J. G. SCRUGHAM
STEPHEN G. DAVIS, JR.
R. E. CALDWELL
FRANK C. EMERSON
Approved:
HERBERT HOOVER
NOTES
Congressional consent to negotiations.—The Act of August 19, 1921 (42 Stat. 171), gave Congress' con-
sent to the negotiation by the States of Arizona, California, Colorado. Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming of "a compact or agreement not later than January 1, 1923, providing for an equitable division and
apportionment among said States of the water supply of the Colorado River and of the streams tributary
thereto * ' "." Provision was made in the Act for appointment by the President of a person to participate in
the negotiations "as the representative of and for the protection of the interests of the United States * * *." It
was also provided that no compact so negotiated should become effective "unless and until the same shall
have been approved by the legislature of each of said States and by the Congress of the United States."
Congress/on a/ consent to compact. —By section 13, subsection (a), of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45
Stat. 1057, 1064), the Congress "approved" the Colorado River Compact and waived the provision of Arti-
cle XI requiring that it be ratified by the legislatures of all seven States. In so doing, it provided that the Con-
gress' approval should "become effective when the State of California and at least five of the other States
mentioned, shall have approved or may hereafter approve said compact * • • and shall consent to such
waiver " * *." Section 4, subsection (a), of the same Act provided, among other things, that the Act should
not be effective until the compact had been ratified by all seven States or until it had been ratified by California
and five other States and "until the State of California by act of its legislature, shall agree irrevocably and un-
conditionally with the United States and for the benefit of the States of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, as an express covenant and in consideration of the passage of this Act, that the
aggregate annual consumptive use (diversions less returns to the river) of water of and from the Colorado
River for use in the State of California, including all uses under contracts made under the provisions of this
Act and all water necessary for the supply of any rights which may now exist, shall not exceed four million
four hundred thousand acre-feet of the waters apportioned to the lower basin States by paragraph (a) of Arti-
cle III of the Colorado River compact, plus not more than one-half of any excess or surplus waters unappor-
tioned by said compact, such uses always to be subject to the terms of said compact." For the Act of the
California legislature agreeing to this condition, see its Act of March 4, 1929, Cal. Stats. 1929, p. 38. For the
President's proclamation of June 25, 1929, declaring that the conditions of the Boulder Canyon Project Act
had been fulfilled, see 46 Stat. 3000.
The evolution of the Boulder Canyon Project Act can be traced in the following bills and the hearings, com-
mittee reports and floor debate thereon indicated:
H.R. 11449, 67th Congress (Hearings before House Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands, 1922-23).
H.R. 2903, 68th Congress (Hearings before House Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands, 1923, and
before House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 1923-24).
S. 727, 68th Congress (Hearings before Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 1924-25).
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H.R. 6251 and H.R. 9826, 69th Congress (Hearings before House Committee on Irrigation and Reclama-
tion, 1926; H. Rept. No. 1657 on H.R. 9826, 1926; Hearings before House Committee on Rules, 1927; 67
Cong. Rec. 5424-5427: 68 Cong. Rec. 2633-2637, 2652-2654, 3073-3080. 3272-3273, 3292-3294,
5822-5832).
S. 3331, 69th Congress (Hearings before Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, acting pur-
suant to S. Res. 320, 68th Congress, 1925-26; S. Rept. No. 654, 1926; 67 Cong. Rec. 8139-8150,
12619-12627; 68 Cong. Rec. 2369-2374, 2761-2765, 4156-4161, 4290-4307, 4309-4326, 4405-4416,
4421-4424, 4426-4456, 4495-4523, 4529-4530, 4541-4542, 4652-4653, 4655, 4763-4766, 4892,
4896-4900).
H.R. 5770, 70th Congress (Hearings before House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 1928).
S. 728 and S. 1274, 70th Congress (Hearings before Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation,
1928; S. Rept. No. 592 on S. 728, 1928; 69 Cong. Rec. 7245-7253, 7387-7397, 7515-7544, 7622-7627,
7630-7638, 9433-9443, 9449-9464, 9886-9891, 10200-10202, 10257-10266, 10271-10282,
10287-10302, 10462-10510. 10511-10513).
H.R. 5773, 70th Congress (Hearings before House Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, 1928; H.
Rept. No. 918, 1928; Hearings before Committee on Rules, 1928; 69 Cong. Rec. 9486-9513, 9622-9658.
9662-9664, 9760-9769, 9770-9786, 9975-9991; 70 Cong. Rec. 67-80, 227-245, 264-269, 277-298.
314-340, 381-402, 458-474, 518-530, 565-603, 615-621. 830-838; P.L. 642, 70th Congress).
State ratifications.— Arizona, Act of February 24, 1944 (Sess. L. 1944, p. 428; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
1956. sec. 45-571).
California, Act of March 4, 1929 (Stats. 1929. p. 37: Deering's Gen. L. (1944), Act 1491).
Colorado, Act of February 26, 1925 (Sess. L. 1925, p. 525; Colo. Rev. Stat. 1963, sec. 149-2-1).
Nevada. Act of March 18, 1925 (Stat. 1925, p. 134; Nev. Rev. Stat. 1957, sec. 538.010).
New Mexico, Act of March 17, 1925 (Laws 1925, p. 116; N.M. Stat. 1953 Ann., sec. 75-34-3 note).
Utah, Act of March 6, 1929 (Laws 1929, p. 25). on which see 36 Op. Arty. Gen. 72 (1929), holding this
act in conformity with the requirements of the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
Wyoming, Act of February 25, 1925 (Sess. L. 1925, p. 85; Wyo. Stat. 1957, sec. 41-505).
The foregoing citations are to the final ratifications by the States concerned. Those of California, Colorado,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming contained a waiver of the seven-State approval provision of Arti-
cle XI of the compact. For earlier ratifications of the compact as a seven-State instrument, see Cal. Stat.
1923, p. 1530; Cal. Stats. 1929, p. 1; Colo. Sess. L. 1923, p. 684; Nev. Stat. 1923. p. 393; N. Mex. Laws
1923, p. 7; Utah Laws, 1923, p. 4; Wyo. Sess. L. 1923, p. 3. And, for earlier ratifications of the compact as
a six-State instrument, see Cal. Stats. 1925, p. 1321; Utah Laws 1925, p. 127, repealed Utah Laws 1927,
p. 1.
Related legislation. —In addition to the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1057), sections 4(a), 6, 8, 13
and 18, see the Acts of August 30, 1935 (49 Stat. 1028, 1039) (Headgate Rock dam, Arizona), July 30.
1947 (61 Stat. 628) (Gila project, Arizona), October 11, 1951 (65 Stat. 404) (San Diego Aqueduct, Califor-
nia), July 3, 1952 (66 Stat. 325) (Collbran project. Colorado), August 31, 1954 (68 Stat. 1045) (Palo Verde
weir, California), April 11, 1956 (70 Stat. 105) (Colorado River storage project and participating projects),
September 2, 1958 (72 Stat. 1726) (Boulder City. Nevada), June 13, 1962 (76 Stat. 96) (Navajo and San
Juan-Chama projects, New Mexico-Colorado), August 6, 1962 (76 Stat. 389) (Fryingpan-Arkansas project,
Colorado), September 2, 1964 (78 Stat. 848) (Dixie project, Utah), October 22, 1965 (79 Stat. 1068)
(Southern Nevada project, Nevada), and September 30, 1968 (82 Stat. 885) (Colorado River Basin
project).
Section 6 of the Boulder Canyon Project Act. cited in the preceding paragraph, provides that Hoover dam
shall be used "First, for river regulation, improvement of navigation, and flood control: second, for irrigation
and domestic uses and satisfaction of present perfected rights in pursuance of Article VIII of said Colorado
River compact; and third, for power." See Arizona v. California, pp. 531. 534f, post on the relation between
this provision and Article IV, paragraph (a), of the Colorado River Compact.
Litigation.—In addition to the four cases entitled Arizona v. California, pp. 531ff post, all of which involve
aspects of the Colorado River Compact, see United States v. Arizona. 295 U.S. 174 (1935). dealing with the
authority of the Secretary of the Interior to construct Parker Dam on the Colorado River.
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Departmental decisions.—Solicitor's opinion M. 28389 (April 4. 1936), advising that the Colorado River
Compact authorizes the diversion of water from the natural watershed into another watershed "if the diverted
water is to be used within the boundaries of the States through which the Colorado River system extends
and " * * if the amount of that diversion does not create a use of Colorado River water in excess of that
allowed by the provisions of the compact." See also Solicitor's opinion dated August 30, 1934 (54 I.D. 593),
advising that section 4(a) of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, taken with Article IH(a) of the compact, limits
the authority of the Secretary of the Interior in making contracts for the sale and delivery of water impounded
behind Hoover Dam to users outside of California to such quantities as will not "interfere with the apportion-
ment to California" made in the section of the Boulder Canyon Project Act cited.
Proposed Lower Colorado River Compact.—By its Act of March 3, 1939 (Ariz. Laws 1939, p. 71), the
legislature of Arizona proposed and "approved and accepted" a compact with the States of California and
Nevada, neither of which has ratified the document. The proposed compact reads as follows:
"The states of Arizona, California and Nevada, desiring to enter into a compact or agreement under the
Act of Congress of the United States of America approved December 21, 1928 (45 Statutes at Large, page
1057, 'Boulder Canyon Project Act'), have agreed upon the following articles:
"ARTICLE I
"The major purposes of this Compact are to provide for the equitable division and apportionment of the
use of the waters of the Colorado River System apportioned to the Lower Basin under the Colorado River
Compact; to establish the relative importance of different beneficial uses of such water: to promote interstate
comity; to remove causes of present and future controversies; and to secure the expeditious agricultural and
industrial development of the Lower Basin, the storage of its waters, and the protection of life and property
from floods.
"ARTICLE II
"As used in this compact:
" 'Colorado River System' means that portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries within the United
States of America;
" 'Colorado River Basin' means all of the drainage area of the Colorado River System and all other territory
within the United States of America to which the waters of the Colorado River System shall be beneficially
applied:
" 'States of the Upper Division' means the states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming;
" 'States of the Lower Division' means the states of Arizona, California and Nevada;
" 'Lee's Ferry' means a point in the main stream of the Colorado River one mile below the mouth of the
Paria River;
" 'Upper Basin' means those parts of the states of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming
within and from which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River System above Lee's Ferry, and also all
parts of said states located without the drainage area of the Colorado River System which are now or shall
hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted from the system above Lee's Ferry;
" 'Lower Basin' means those parts of the states of Arizona. California, Nevada, New Mexico and Utah
within and from which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River System below Lee's Ferry, and also all
parts of said states located without the drainage area of the Colorado River System which are now or shall
hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted from the system below Lee's Ferry;
" 'Domestic Use' includes the use of water for household, stock, municipal, mining, milling, industrial, and
other like purposes, but excludes the generation of electrical power.
"ARTICLE III
"(a) The aggregate annual consumptive use (diversions less returns to the river) of water of and from the
Colorado River for use in the state of California, including all uses under contracts made under the provisions
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of the Boulder Canyon Project Act and all waters necessary for the supply of any rights which may now exist,
shall not exceed four million, four hundred thousand acre feet of the waters apportioned to the Lower Basin
States by paragraph (a) of Article III of the Colorado River Compact, plus not more than one-half of any ex- 4
cess or surplus waters unapportioned by said Colorado River Compact, such uses always to be subject to the
terms of said compact.
"(b) Of the seven million, five hundred thousand acre feet annually apportioned to the Lower Basin by
paragraph (a) of Article III of the Colorado River Compact, there is hereby apportioned annually to the state
of Nevada three hundred thousand acre feet and annually to the state of Arizona two million, eight hundred
thousand acre feet for the exclusive beneficial consumptive use by said states of Nevada and Arizona, respec-
tively, in perpetuity.
"(c) The state of Arizona may annually use one-half of the excess or surplus waters unapportioned by the
Colorado River Compact.
"(d) In addition to the water covered by paragraphs (b) and (c) hereof, the state of Arizona shall have the
exclusive beneficial consumptive use of the Gila River and its tributaries within the boundaries of the state of
Arizona in perpetuity.
"(e) The waters of the Gila River and its tributaries, except return flow after the same enters the Colorado
River, shall never be subject to any diminution whatever by any allowance of water which may be made by
treaty or otherwise to the United States of Mexico, but if. as provided in paragraph (c) of Article III of the Col-
orado River Compact, it shall become necessary to supply water to the United States of Mexico from waters
over and above the quantities which are surplus as defined by said Colorado River Compact, then the state of
California shall and does mutually agree with the state of Arizona to supply, out of the main stream of the
Colorado River, one-half of any deficiency which must be supplied to Mexico by the Lower Basin.
"(f) Neither the states of Arizona, California nor Nevada will withhold water nor require the delivery of
water which can not reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses.
"(g) All the provisions of this compact or agreement shall be subject in all particulars to the provisions of the
Colorado Compact.
"ARTICLE IV
"This compact or agreement shall take effect and become binding and obligatory when it shall have been
approved by the Congress of the United States of America, by the legislatures of each of the states of Arizona,
California and Nevada and when the States of Arizona, California and Nevada shall have ratified the Col-
orado River Compact. When approved by the legislature of a signatory state the original and four copies of
this compact or agreement shall be signed by the governor of such state and notice of such approval and sign-
ing shall be given by such governor to the governors of the other signatory states and to the President of the
United States of America. The governor last signing shall forward the original copy for deposit in the archives
of the Department of State of the United States of America and one copy to the governor of each of the other
signatory states."
By the second paragraph of section 4, subsection (a), of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1057,
1059), the Congress "authorized" Arizona, California, and Nevada "to enter into an agreement which shall
provide (1) that of the 7,500,000 acre-feet annually apportioned to the lower basin by paragraph (a) of Arti-
cle III of the Colorado River compact, there shall be apportioned to the State of Nevada 300.000 acre-feet
and to the State of Arizona 2,800,000 acre-feet for exclusive beneficial consumptive use in perpetuity, and
(2) that the State of Arizona may annually use one-half of the excess or surplus waters unapportioned by the
Colorado River compact, and (3) that the State of Arizona shall have the exclusive beneficial consumptive
use of the Gila River and its tributaries within the boundaries of said State, and (4) that the waters of the Gila
River and its tributaries, except return flow after the same enters the Colorado River, shall never be subject to
any diminution whatever by any allowance of water which may be made by treaty or otherwise to the United
States of Mexico but if, as provided in paragraph (c) of Article III of the Colorado River compact, it shall
become necessary to supply water to the United States of Mexico from waters over and above the quantities
which are surplus as defined by said compact, then the State of California shall and will mutually agree with
the State of Arizona to supply, out of the main stream of the Colorado River, one-half of any deficiency
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which must be supplied to Mexico by the lower basin, and (5) that the State of California shall and will further
mutually agree with the States of Arizona and Nevada that none of said three States shall withhold water and
none shall require the delivery of water, which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural
uses, and (6) that all of the provisions of said tri-State agreement shall be subject in all particulars to the provi-
sions of the Colorado River Compact, and (7) said agreement to take effect upon the ratification of the Col-
orado River compact by Arizona, California, and Nevada."
Cf. section 8, subsection (b), of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1057, 1062) providing that in
the event a compact between Arizona, California, and Nevada or any two of them was negotiated and con-
sented to by the Congress on or before January 1, 1929, the United States would be controlled thereby in its
construction, management, and operation of Hoover dam and the other works authorized by the Act, but
that if such a compact were concluded after that date the compact should be subject to all contracts entered
into by the Secretary of the Interior under authority of section 5 of the Act prior to the date of Congress' con-
sent thereto.
Upper Colorado River Compact.—For text, see pp. 339ff post.
Mexican Water Treaty.—For text, see pp. 456ff post.
Bibliography.— Olson, The Colorado River Compact (1963); Wilbur and Ely. The Hoouer Dam Docu-
ments (2d ed., 1948; House Document No. 717, 80th Congress). The minutes of the first 18 meetings of the
commission which negotiated the Colorado River Compact were published in 1948 by the Colorado State
Water Conservation Board; those of the 19th-25th, 26th (first part), and 27th meetings were reproduced by
the Department of Justice in 1953. All of these minutes were also reproduced by the Upper Colorado River
Commission, Grand Junction, Colo., 1956.
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